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SUMMARY The current trade war between China and the United States has 
drawn global attention to competition in U.S.-China relations. Such com-
petition should not, however, obscure areas of mutual interest where coop-
eration is possible. Based on U.S.-China trilateral pilot projects, trilateral 
cooperation creates opportunities for aid officials and practitioners from 
China and the United States to communicate, but it would be ambitious to 
expect the limited number of pilot projects to shape Chinese aid practices 
or improve Chinese aid performances in the short term. These pilot proj-
ects are small in scale, and the level of coordination between China and the 
United States should be strengthened further. More effort by both sides is 
needed if trilateral aid cooperation is to sustain and even thrive. In this con-
text, trilateral aid cooperation has the potential to become a modality in the 
middle, promoting mutual understanding and facilitating coordination.
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China’s rise is significantly influencing interna-
tional aid architecture by bringing in additional 
resources for development and by providing an 
alternative development experience. How dis-
ruptive the changes will be, however, remains 
unclear. Chinese aid has risen dramatically 
since 2000, with an average annual growth of 
29.4 percent over the period 2004–2009 and 
by an amount of 89.34 billion RMB (US$14.4 
billion) in 2010–2012, exceeding more than 
one third of Chinese total aid in the pre-
vious six decades.1 China is also expanding 
its foreign aid program through new plat-
forms such as the Belt and Road Initiative and 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
A key question is whether this expansion pro-
vides opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation in 
countries receiving development assistance. Thus 
far, there has been little in-depth empirically-
based analysis of China’s trilateral aid cooperation, 
which refers to the implementation of aid projects 
involving a traditional donor, an emerging donor, 
and a recipient country. This paper examines the 
nature and prospects of U.S.-China trilateral aid 
cooperation and offers policy recommendations. 
This research presents data drawn from the 
author’s fieldwork in seven countries involved in 
China’s recent trilateral aid cooperation: Australia, 
Cambodia, China, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the United States. 
Interviews were conducted with more than 150 
interlocutors between November 2014 and 
September 2018, comprised of about one-third 
government aid officials and the rest mainly project 
participants, scholars, and officials of multilateral 
development organizations with first-hand knowl-
edge of and experience in trilateral aid projects.
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Features of Chinese and U.S. Aid
Chinese aid consists of grants, interest-free 
loans, and concessional loans. A main differ-
ence between China and traditional donors in 
terms of aid calculation relates to concessional 
loans. While many traditional donors only pro-
vide grant-based aid, more than one half of 
Chinese aid is distributed in the form of conces-
sional loans with an annual interest rate of 2–3 
percent and a repayment period of 15–20 years 
(including a five- to seven-year grace period). 
The vast majority of Chinese concessional aid  
is devoted to large-scale infrastructure such as 
roads, ports, energy, and telecommunications. 
Military aid forms a significant part of Chinese 
foreign aid, but due to its sensitiveness, remains 
opaque and is excluded from China’s foreign 
aid white papers. China considers its aid as part 
of South-South cooperation, which is mutual 
assistance between developing countries, and 
therefore different from North-South coop-
eration. On the grounds of non-interference, 
China rejects conditioning its aid on political 
or economic reforms in recipient countries. 
More than 30 ministerial-level agencies 
are involved in Chinese aid management. The 
main coordinator is the China International 
Development Cooperation Agency, established 
as a stand-alone organization in April 2018. 
Other important players include the minis-
tries of commerce, foreign affairs, and finance 
as well as the China Import-Export Bank. 
U.S. foreign aid includes development, 
humanitarian, and military assistance. About 20 
government agencies implement U.S. develop-
ment and humanitarian aid programs. These pri-
marily include the U.S. Agency for International 
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Development (USAID), Department of State, 
Department of Treasury, and Millennium 
Challenge Corporation. As the lead development 
agency, USAID receives policy guidance from 
the Department of State and administers grant-
based aid. By contrast, the U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation, established 
in October 2018 to replace the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, serves as the U.S. gov-
ernment’s development finance institution and 
provides loans, political risk insurance, and finan-
cial support for private equity funds.2 The U.S. 
aid program focuses on such areas as humani-
tarian assistance, agriculture, health, democracy, 
human rights, and empowering women. The 
United States adopts a patron-client relationship 
in aid delivery and tries to promote economic and 
political liberalization in recipient countries.3 
Overview of U.S.-China Development  
Cooperation
China’s response to U.S.-China engagement on 
aid cooperation since 2008 has been cautious, if 
not negative. To test the waters, Chinese semi-
official think tanks, especially the China Academy 
of Social Sciences, are engaged in policy dia-
logue with the United States on development 
cooperation. China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), the main guardian of Chinese aid 
prior to the China International Development 
Cooperation Agency, did not send representa-
tives to attend the aid and development segment 
of the first China-U.S. Global Issues Forum in 
April 2005.4 The establishment of a U.S.-China 
bilateral dialogue on aid was also not a linear 
process. In the face of growing effort from the 
United States and under pressure from Beijing to 
engage with Washington for the sake of bilateral 
relations, MOFCOM has become more open to 
trilateral aid cooperation with the United States, 
although its attitude remains cautious. Trilateral 
aid cooperation has been receiving increasing 
attention from Chinese and U.S. leaders since 
2011. It was included in their Strategic and 
Economic Dialogues, a high-level dialogue 
mechanism, between 2012 and 2016 and in their 
first Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in 2017. 
On the ground, the two countries conducted 
trilateral aid projects focusing on facility improve-
ments to the University of Liberia (2008–2010), 
agriculture and food security in Timor-Leste 
(2013–2014), and joint training of Afghan dip-
lomats (2013–2017). They also cooperated in 
combating HIV/AIDS, swine flu, and Ebola 
and pledged joint support to the Africa Centers 
for Diseases Control and Prevention in Africa. 
The United States also began criticizing 
Chinese aid practices in the same period. At 
the root of this concern has been the expan-
sion of Chinese aid programs, along with prac-
tices inconsistent with traditional development 
assistance. U.S. officials and scholars have also 
expressed grave concern over the debt risks of 
developing countries associated with Chinese 
loan facilities and have suspected that China 
intends to swap the debts for equity in these 
countries if they default on repayment.
Assessment
To date, China has no clear policy on trilateral 
aid cooperation, although public and private 
remarks by Chinese officials offer some insight 
into Beijing’s position. The Chinese govern-
ment is open to trilateral aid cooperation but 
remains cautious, not willing to actively push 
for it. China only considers proposals supported 
and preferably initiated and led by recipient 
countries and only on a case-by-case basis. China 
is still testing trilateral aid cooperation with a 
few selected traditional donor states and mul-
tilateral agencies.5 In terms of practice, China’s 
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trilateral aid cooperation is in its infancy and 
constitutes a tiny part of the Chinese aid pro-
gram. The majority of its pilot trilateral proj-
ects are small-grant aid projects focusing on 
capacity building, agriculture, and health. 
From a strategic perspective, as China becomes 
a prominent donor, trilateral aid cooperation 
serves as a new vehicle for the United States to 
engage with China and enrich the bilateral rela-
tionship. Although the United States still has a 
bilateral aid program with China, there is a notable 
gap in communication between Washington and 
Beijing on the issue of development cooperation. 
Trilateral cooperation has become a new instru-
ment in the toolbox of U.S. engagement with 
China. In a similar vein, the Chinese govern-
ment has largely adopted trilateral aid coopera-
tion to serve its bilateral relationship with the 
United States. Beijing sees it as a new opportunity 
to demonstrate China’s willingness to cooperate 
with the United States and ease Washington’s con-
cerns over China’s fast-growing aid program. It 
wants to project China’s image as a responsible 
stakeholder, a term coined by then U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 
2005. As argued by the majority of interviewees 
in this research project, trilateral aid cooperation 
provides a new opportunity for the two countries 
to enhance mutual understanding and trust.
From a developmental perspective, the United 
States and China have varied expectations for  
trilateral cooperation. Washington aims to use 
trilateral aid cooperation as a new opportunity 
to engage with Beijing, shape Chinese aid, and 
encourage China to make a greater contribution 
to international development cooperation in a 
constructive way. For China, the concern is how 
to improve aid performance as its aid programs 
continue to rapidly expand. Engaging with tra-
ditional donors becomes an important way to 
acquire new knowledge. Based on U.S.-China 
trilateral pilot projects, trilateral cooperation cre-
ates opportunities for aid officials and practitio-
ners from China and the United States to com-
municate, but it would be ambitious to expect 
the limited number of pilot projects to shape 
Chinese aid practices or improve Chinese aid per-
formances in the short term. These pilot projects 
are small in scale, and the level of coordination 
between China and the U.S. should be strength-
ened further. For example, the training program 
for Afghan diplomats was conducted separately in 
the United States and in China. As for the project 
in Timor-Leste, although agricultural experts from 
both sides delivered in-classroom lectures to local 
participants under the same roof, the in-the-field 
training and harvesting activities were conducted 
separately, which limited the scope of coordination. 
Prospects
In the near future, there are potential opportuni-
ties for China and the United States to conduct 
more trilateral aid cooperation. However, foreign 
aid is part of their respective foreign policies 
and is designed to serve their respective national 
interests. Therefore, although open to trilateral 
cooperation, Beijing and Washington will con-
tinue to test the waters through pilot projects 
and be cautious in initiating new cooperation. 
The current level of mutual strategic dis-
trust makes U.S.-China trilateral aid cooperation 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. The Trump 
administration discounted many of his predeces-
sors’ policies of engagement with China as a failure, 
as exemplified by the 2017 U.S. National Security 
Strategy and the 2018 U.S. National Defense 
Strategy. Treating China as a rival, the U.S. gov-
ernment is adopting hardline strategies to counter 
China’s global and regional influence. U.S. devel-
opment financing is part of that effort. The U.S. 
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Leste
government has vowed to devote more attention to 
the Indo-Pacific region in order to compete with 
China. On July 30, 2018, U.S. Secretary of State 
Michael Pompeo outlined America’s Indo-Pacific 
economic vision, pledging that the United States 
will expand its economic engagement in the region, 
including supporting digital economy, energy, and 
infrastructure; doubling U.S. development finance 
capacity to US$60 billion; and calling on the U.S. 
private sector to invest in the region.6 The U.S. 
government has also expressed concern about the 
debt-for-equity swap related to Chinese conces-
sional loans in the region, arguing that “if they’re 
not structured in a way in which the nations of 
the region can pay them back, over time, you will 
see that tends to comprises their sovereignty.”7 
Another measure adopted by the United States 
to compete with China in developing countries 
is the creation of the International Development 
Finance Corporation as a stand-alone development 
finance institution by merging the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and USAID’s 
Development Credit Authority and expanding 
U.S. development finance capacities. As OPIC 
President and CEO Ray Washburne explicitly 
remarked, the creation of this new agency will 
enable the United States to better “compete with 
countries like China by providing an alternative to 
state-directed investment in emerging markets.”8 
The political climate in China has also 
changed. The nationalist Xi Jinping admin-
istration has responded uncompromisingly 
to tensions with the United States on such 
issues as the South China Sea and trade. Such 
growing tensions in U.S.-China bilateral rela-
tions have largely contributed to the cancel-
lation of the second phase of the trilateral aid 
project in aquaculture in Timor-Leste, which 
was endorsed by both sides in September 2015. 
Even if U.S.-China tensions subside, coor-
dination problems and technical obstacles will 
remain. Aid practitioners need to address prac-
tical issues including the lengthy and painstaking 
process of coordination and their substantial dif-
ferences in aid implementation, financing, moni-
toring, evaluation, and even language. Professor 
Li Anshan, a senior Chinese expert on Africa 
from Peking University, sees dim prospects for 
trilateral cooperation between China and western 
donors in Africa due to their significant differ-
ences in aid delivery.9 China’s cooperation with 
other traditional donors and multilateral agen-
cies has already revealed such challenges. For 
example, preparation for the Australia-China-
Papua New Guinea trilateral malaria control 
project, costing four million Australian dollars, 
lasted more than four years. In May 2007, the 
China Export Import Bank and the World Bank 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
on development cooperation in third countries. 
To a large extent, however, this turned out to 
be a failure as their differences in aid modalities 
and their institutional cultures were too great to 
bridge in the short term. In addition, reserva-
tions among some officials in recipient countries 
over trilateral modality could easily discourage 
China from cooperating with the United States. 
Despite these obstacles, closer trilateral aid 
cooperation should be pursued, in part because 
it could help improve U.S.-China relations. 
Tensions in current U.S-China relations make 
trilateral aid cooperation particularly useful as 
long as both sides have a genuine desire to mend 
the relationship and prevent it from slipping 
into confrontation. The two governments could 
build on existing cooperation in such areas as 
counterterrorism, HIV/AIDS, and Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). As then U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell said in November 
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2003, “it is upon such concrete forms of coopera-
tion on issues of regional and global importance 
that a 21st century U.S.-China relationship will 
be built, issue by issue, experience by experi-
ence, challenge by challenge, initiative by initia-
tive, program by program.”10 In September 2011, 
the Chinese government unveiled the concept of 
China’s core interests, which include “state sover-
eignty, national security, territorial integrity and 
national reunification, China’s political system 
established by the Constitution and overall social 
stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring 
sustainable economic and social development.”11 
Clearly, development cooperation is an area of 
low sensitivity and thus has the potential to con-
tribute positively to the U.S.-China relationship. 
Opportunities for development cooperation 
could also arise from the newly created China 
International Development Cooperation Agency 
(CIDCA). The setting up of this vice-ministerial 
level agency in April 2018 was a long-anticipated 
effort in the reform of the Chinese aid system. 
After six months of internal preparation, including 
establishing the organizational structure, carrying 
out top-level aid policy planning, and straight-
ening out relations with other line ministries, 
CIDCA began functioning in late 2018. China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will play a more 
prominent role in Chinese aid decision making 
given that CIDCA is under the supervision of 
both Yang Jiechi, former MFA Minister and 
incumbent director of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s Foreign Affairs Office, and Wang Yi, cur-
rent MFA Minister and State Councilor (equiva-
lent in ranking to the Vice Premier). As MFA is 
tasked with managing China’s foreign policy, it is 
highly likely that MFA officials will be interested 
in using trilateral aid cooperation as a tool to 
mend deteriorating U.S.-China relations.
Policy Recommendations
Drawing upon the results of China’s trilat-
eral pilot projects with the United States and 
other traditional donors, here are six rec-
ommendations that can improve the pros-
pects for more constructive U.S.-China tri-
lateral aid cooperation in the future.
First, boost support from the two govern-
ments and resume their annual development 
dialogue. More political engagement and com-
mitment are needed for U.S.-China trilateral aid 
cooperation to be sustained and even thrive, espe-
cially at difficult times when the bilateral relation-
ship is marked by competition. As a Chinese aid 
official deeply involved in trilateral aid coopera-
tion noted, China’s trilateral aid cooperation will 
likely grow in the future, but this will “ultimately 
depend on the attitudes of Chinese leaders.”12 
Support from U.S. leaders is equally essential 
for the two sides to reach agreement on any tri-
lateral aid project. To build up mutual trust, the 
two countries should resume their annual devel-
opment dialogue under the exchange and com-
munication mechanism as prescribed in the 
2015 MOU on development cooperation. 
Second, strengthen the role of recipient coun-
tries by putting them at the center of these trilat-
eral projects. Both China and the United States 
have agreed on “the principle of raised, agreed 
and led by recipient countries” as a prerequisite 
for their trilateral aid cooperation.13 However, 
voicing respect for recipient countries that are 
supportive of trilateral cooperation is far from 
enough. Aid from China and the United States 
should be guided by the development priorities of 
China and the 
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the recipient countries. More concrete actions are 
needed to place the role and will of recipient coun-
tries at the center. China and the United States 
should make more effort to understand the needs 
of recipient countries. Rather than merely focusing 
on the central governments of recipient countries, 
Washington and especially Beijing should also 
reach out to other stakeholders, including local 
governments, the business sector, and civil society. 
Third, seek full support of resident ambas-
sadors and engage higher levels of decisionmakers 
as well. Political commitments from China and 
the United States are not sufficient to make tri-
lateral cooperation happen. Full support of the 
two countries’ ambassadors on the ground and 
other higher levels of decisionmakers is equally 
important. Their views on whether the proposed 
trilateral project benefits their respective country’s 
national interests and bilateral relations with the 
recipient country could make or break the coop-
eration. Otherwise, their inaction or opposition 
will lead to foot-dragging. For example, David 
Shinn, former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and 
Burkina Faso, noted that although the Bureau of 
African Affairs in the U.S. Department of State 
proposed several trilateral aid cooperation projects 
in Africa, very few materialized partly due to a lack 
of interest by ambassadors on the ground from 
both China and the United States.14 Also, as the 
Chinese and U.S. ambassadors’ attitudes toward 
trilateral aid cooperation are recipient country-spe-
cific and ambassador-specific, it would be helpful 
to understand the personality of Chinese and U.S. 
ambassadors in individual recipient countries.
Fourth, learn from pilot projects undertaken 
by others. In particular, Beijing and Washington 
could learn lessons from the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
United Kingdom, two pioneers of trilateral coop-
eration with China. UNDP officials suggest that 
actors in trilateral cooperation should define 
their roles, responsibilities, and procedures clearly 
and develop a rigorous monitoring and evalua-
tion framework.15 Some lessons from U.K.-China 
trilateral cooperation include: ensure strong 
management support and coordination staff on 
the ground; back technology transfer with rig-
orous analysis and a sound business case; build 
time for delays into project design; set realistic 
targets; and build on each side’s comparative 
advantages.16 These lessons can shed light on 
U.S.-China trilateral cooperation in the future.
Fifth, undertake projects in less-sensitive areas. 
Potential areas for future U.S.-China coopera-
tion include agriculture, food security and nutri-
tion, public health (especially pandemic diseases 
control), natural disaster reduction, humanitarian 
assistance, renewable energy, climate change, 
and even peacekeeping. In 2015–2016, the U.S. 
Center for American Progress conducted a research 
project on prospects for U.S.-China coopera-
tion in Southeast Asia. By engaging extensively 
with stakeholders across six countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
Singapore), the research team identified a number 
of sectors for U.S.-China cooperation in the region 
such as the ocean, energy and climate change, 
sustainable infrastructure development, people-
to-people exchange, regional connectivity, and 
Track 2 engagement.17 Some of these areas are 
worth considering as they are less sensitive and 
correspond to the needs of recipient countries.
Sixth, consider contributing funding and 
expertise in tandem. While China and the United 
States need to focus on less-sensitive areas as sug-
gested above, it is important that they improve the 
designs for future projects and conduct higher-
level cooperation. Instead of acting individu-
ally, each should consider contributing funding 
and expertise in tandem. It would be difficult for 
China and the 
United States 
should undertake 
trilateral aid 
projects in less-
sensitive areas
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China to take the first step in this direction, how-
ever, because Beijing is more willing to provide 
technical expertise than funding in trilateral coop-
eration with traditional donor states and because 
it insists the latter provide funding. This is not an 
issue of China’s financial capacity but more of a 
perception that China is still a developing country 
compared to traditional donors. But for the sake 
of high-quality cooperation in the long run, it 
is worth both China and the U.S. contributing 
funding and expertise in future trilateral proj-
ects and jointly managing these projects. More 
dialogue between the Washington and Beijing 
might soften China’s position in this regard. 
Conclusion
This research has shown that trilateral aid coop-
eration provides a new opportunity for China 
and the United States to enrich their bilateral 
relations. However, the significance of the tri-
lateral modality in serving U.S.-China relations 
and promoting their aid engagement should 
not be overestimated. Compared to bilateral 
aid, trilateral cooperation is limited in number 
of projects and volume. Trilateral aid projects 
are still a drop in the two countries’ respec-
tive aid buckets. Given the current tensions 
in U.S.-China relations, prospects for trilat-
eral aid cooperation are not bright in the near 
future. This should not, however, obscure areas 
for cooperation in the long run. More effort 
is needed from both sides if their trilateral aid 
cooperation is to be sustained and even thrive. 
The international aid landscape will con-
tinue to evolve. Due to the differences between 
China and traditional donors, China will not 
likely join the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee in the foreseeable future. The estab-
lishment of the BRICS New Development 
Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
and the Belt and Road Initiative are examples 
of China’s attempt to shape the international 
development landscape. In this context, trilat-
eral aid cooperation has the potential to become 
a modality in the middle, promoting mutual 
understanding and facilitating coordination. 
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